On 20 September 2026 Yurii Bauman, Managing Partner of Bauman Kondratyuk Attorneys Association, was the guest of «Tvoye Pravo» (Your Right), the legal affairs programme of Ukrainian Radio, the country’s public broadcaster. The 39-minute conversation with host Nataliia Paraka addressed compensation from the State — a question that matters to every business and every citizen who has ever been on the wrong end of a state decision: does the State actually pay for the mistakes of its officials, and what are the realistic odds of not merely winning in court but collecting the money awarded?

What the conversation was about

The discussion turned on a simple proposition: the State pays for paperwork, not for pain. Article 56 of the Constitution of Ukraine guarantees everyone compensation for damage caused by unlawful decisions, acts or omissions of public authorities and their officials, and the Civil Code (Articles 1173, 1174 and 1176) places that liability on the State regardless of whether the individual official was at fault. Between the right to compensation and the money arriving in a bank account, however, lies a chain of procedures in which most claimants make the same mistakes: they fail to document their losses from day one, they sign a “no claims” acknowledgement when seized property is returned, they present the judgment for enforcement late, and they never claim compensation for the State’s delay in paying.

Mr Bauman walked listeners through the five heads of damage that may be claimed against the State (actual losses, lost profit, moral damage, injury to health and life, and the costs of legal defence and property recovery), the three lawful instruments for extracting information from a public authority and the statutory deadlines attached to each (a citizen’s appeal, a request for public information, and an attorney’s request), the elements that must be proven in a claim against the State, and the step-by-step procedure for presenting a judgment for enforcement through the State Treasury Service, including the exact moment from which the delay starts to run and 3 % per annum and inflation losses become payable.

Three Supreme Court cases discussed on air

UAH 2,000,000 for 137 months under investigation. A man was charged with murder, spent 137 months under investigation and trial, 78 of them in custody, and was ultimately acquitted. The State argued that moral damage should be calculated from a notional “reference value” of UAH 1,600 per month. The Civil Cassation Court of the Supreme Court rejected that approach and confirmed that the statutory minimum is calculated from the actual minimum wage for every month of unlawful prosecution, while any award above the minimum must be supported by evidence (rulings of the Civil Cassation Court of 27 May 2026 in case No. 346/1943/25 and of 29 July 2026 in case No. 757/20448/22-ц).

One signature — minus UAH 3,000,000. An entrepreneur recovered property seized during a search and, on receiving it back, signed a return report containing the words “I have no claims”. His subsequent claim for UAH 3 million in damages was dismissed: his own signature became evidence that he had no claims against the State (ruling of the Civil Cassation Court of 1 July 2026 in case No. 522/759/25).

The State pays for delay like any other debtor. An award of UAH 295,000 was paid by the Treasury more than a year late. The Supreme Court confirmed that inflation losses and 3 % per annum under Article 625 of the Civil Code accrue on such a debt: UAH 24,971 in inflation losses plus 3 % per annum were recovered, while a further UAH 1 million claimed as moral damage “for the delay” was refused (ruling of the Civil Cassation Court of 16 April 2025 in case No. 607/9021/22). The underlying position that Article 625 and the Law “On State Guarantees for the Enforcement of Court Decisions” together form an “effective compensatory mechanism” against the State was laid down by the Grand Chamber of the Supreme Court in its ruling of 3 October 2023 in case No. 686/7081/21: the delay runs from the day after the three-month period following submission of the documents to the Treasury expires.

Slides prepared for the broadcast

Bauman Kondratyuk Attorneys Association prepared six slides specifically for the programme: the heads of damage, the ways of obtaining information from the State, the core legal framework, the mechanism of 3 % per annum and inflation losses with references to case law, the elements of proof, and the step-by-step procedure for presenting a judgment for enforcement. Browse the carousel — each slide opens at full size.

1 / 6 Types of damage a citizen may claim against the State

Prepared by Bauman Kondratyuk Attorneys Association for the «Tvoye Pravo» programme on Ukrainian Radio.

Key takeaways for citizens and businesses

No court fee is payable on a claim for damage caused by public authorities, investigators, prosecutors or courts (Article 3(2)(11) of the Law “On Court Fees”); the limitation period is three years (Article 257 of the Civil Code); and the fault of the individual official does not need to be proven. Yet the right to compensation is realised only by those who, from day one, document every fact from three sources — a document issued by the State, an independent document (a valuer, a doctor, a bank, an employer) and their own contemporaneous record — who never sign a “no claims” acknowledgement when property is returned, and who obtain the writ of execution immediately after the judgment enters into force and lodge it with the Treasury. Three months after a complete set of documents is filed, every day of delay entitles the creditor to 3 % per annum compensation under the Law “On State Guarantees for the Enforcement of Court Decisions” and to inflation losses plus 3 % per annum under Article 625 of the Civil Code.

“The State is liable for the outcome, not for the intentions of its officials. But it pays only those who can prove every hryvnia with a document. A single signed ‘no claims’ line can close the door on compensation for an entire business.”

Yurii Bauman, Managing Partner, Bauman Kondratyuk Attorneys Association, on Ukrainian Radio

Where to listen and watch

The full recording is available in the Ukrainian Radio archive: «Tvoye Pravo», broadcast of 20 September 2026 (39 min, in Ukrainian). A summary with the key figures from the programme and all six slides has been published on the firm’s Instagram page: slide carousel and Reels video.

If your situation resembles those discussed on air — unlawful criminal prosecution, property seized and not returned, or a court judgment the State has failed to honour — contact us through the contact form or at office@bkadvisers.com.ua. An initial consultation allows us to assess which evidence already exists and which can still be gathered.

Sources and legislation referred to in the broadcast

Broadcast: Ukrainian Radio, «Tvoye Pravo», 20 September 2026, archive recording.
Case law: Grand Chamber of the Supreme Court, ruling of 3 October 2023 in case No. 686/7081/21; Civil Cassation Court of the Supreme Court, rulings of 16 April 2025 in case No. 607/9021/22, 17 September 2025 in case No. 461/6351/23, 6 May 2026 in case No. 752/29491/21, 27 May 2026 in case No. 346/1943/25, 1 July 2026 in case No. 522/759/25 and 29 July 2026 in case No. 757/20448/22-ц (Unified State Register of Court Decisions).
Legislation: Constitution of Ukraine (Art. 56, 62); Civil Code of Ukraine (Art. 22, 23, 257, 625, 1173–1176, 1191); Law of Ukraine “On the Procedure for Compensation of Damage Caused to a Citizen by Unlawful Actions of Bodies Conducting Operational-Search Activities, Pre-Trial Investigation Bodies, the Prosecutor’s Office and Courts”; Law of Ukraine “On State Guarantees for the Enforcement of Court Decisions”; Procedure for Enforcing Decisions on Recovery of Funds from the State and Local Budgets or from Debtors (Cabinet of Ministers Resolution No. 845 of 3 August 2011); Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine; Code of Administrative Procedure of Ukraine; Civil Procedure Code of Ukraine; Law of Ukraine “On Court Fees”; Law of Ukraine “On Citizens’ Appeals”; Law of Ukraine “On Access to Public Information”; Law of Ukraine “On the Bar and Practice of Law”.

Сообщение Yurii Bauman on Ukrainian Radio: will the State pay out of its own pocket for the mistakes of its officials? появились сначала на Bauman Kondratyuk.

This week Ukraine witnessed something rare. The Prosecutor General signed a notice of suspicion against the Director of the National Anti-Corruption Bureau (NABU), announced it in a video address recorded abroad, and within hours his own Office declared that no one had been notified of any suspicion and that the corresponding entries in the pre-trial investigation register had been annulled. The political dimension of the story has been debated everywhere. We suggest reading it differently: as the most instructive case study in years of one institution of Ukrainian criminal procedure that a business owner, a senior executive or a politician may encounter without any warning at all — the signing and service of a notice of suspicion.

Yurii Bauman, Managing Partner of Bauman Kondratyuk Attorneys Association, commented on the events for the Ukrainian outlet Livyi Bereh (LB.ua) and on Espreso TV’s programme What Next?; the broadcast remarks were reported separately by ADVOKAT POST. What follows is a professional analysis of the institution itself, and, at the end, the lessons that decision-makers in business and politics should draw from the case. Quotations are translated from the Ukrainian originals.

What a notice of suspicion is in law — and why a signature is not yet a suspicion

In public discourse, “suspicion” is a headline: so-and-so “has been served with a notice of suspicion”. In Ukraine’s Criminal Procedure Code (CPC) it is not a headline but a procedural act with precisely defined grounds, content, signatory and, crucially, a moment from which it takes legal effect.

There are exactly three grounds for notifying a person of suspicion (Article 276 CPC): the person has been apprehended at the scene of a criminal offence or immediately after it; a measure of restraint is being sought against the person; or sufficient evidence has been gathered to suspect the person of committing a criminal offence. The third ground is by far the most common in cases involving business and public figures, and it is the one that gives the prosecution the widest discretion.

Nor is the content of the document left to chance. Article 277 CPC requires that a written notice of suspicion be drawn up by a prosecutor, or by an investigator with the prosecutor’s approval, and that it contain, among other things, the substance of the suspicion, the legal qualification with reference to the relevant article of the Criminal Code, a concise statement of the facts including the time and place of the alleged offence, the suspect’s rights, and the signature of the official who issues the notice.

Then comes the provision that public debate usually skips. The status of suspect arises neither from a signature nor from an announcement. Under Article 42(1) CPC, a suspect is a person who has been notified of suspicion in the manner prescribed by Articles 276–279; a person apprehended on suspicion of committing a criminal offence; or a person in respect of whom a notice has been drawn up but not served because their whereabouts could not be established — provided that steps were taken to serve it in the manner prescribed for the service of notices. In other words, between the signed sheet of paper and the suspect stands a procedural act: service. Without it, the suspicion exists as a document, but not as a legal fact.

Yurii Bauman put the point to LB.ua in a single sentence: “The Prosecutor General’s signature on a notice of suspicion is not yet a suspicion. A person becomes a suspect from the moment the notice is served on them.”

Who is entitled to sign: the ordinary rule and specially protected categories

For the vast majority of people — company owners, directors, chief financial officers — the ordinary rule applies: the notice of suspicion is drawn up and signed by the investigator with the approval of the prosecutor, or by the prosecutor supervising the investigation. Checking authority here comes down to whether the signatory belongs to the group of investigators or prosecutors assigned to the proceedings and whether the document bears the prosecutor’s approval.

For certain categories of persons the law provides an enhanced safeguard: the decision to notify of suspicion must be taken not by a rank-and-file prosecutor but by an official at the very top (Article 481 CPC). Advocates, members of local councils and mayors are notified by the Prosecutor General, a Deputy Prosecutor General or the head of a regional prosecutor’s office within their remit. Members of Parliament, presidential candidates, the Parliamentary Commissioner for Human Rights, members of the Accounting Chamber, prosecutors of the Specialised Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO), the Director and other officers of NABU, Deputy Prosecutors General and the head of the National Agency on Corruption Prevention are notified by the Prosecutor General (or the acting Prosecutor General) or by the Deputy Prosecutor General who heads SAPO. Judges, judges of the Constitutional Court and members of the High Council of Justice and the High Qualification Commission of Judges are notified by the Prosecutor General or a Deputy; judges of the High Anti-Corruption Court (HACC) only by the Prosecutor General (or the acting Prosecutor General). The Prosecutor General himself is notified by a Deputy Prosecutor General.

So in the case that caused this week’s uproar, the Prosecutor General did have the authority to sign a notice of suspicion against the Director of NABU. Parliamentarians with legal backgrounds, practising advocates and Yurii Bauman himself all confirmed as much: “Kravchenko had the right to sign the notice. Both cover letters to the notices are dated 12 September — the day before he crossed the border at 2:30 a.m. So they were signed on a Saturday, in Ukraine. There is no conflict there.” Separately, he noted an ethical dimension that the Code does not regulate: “A man whose Office is under investigation by NABU uses his final days in post to strike at the head of the body investigating it. But that kind of ethics is not codified in the CPC.”

Service: on the day of issue, in person, by an authorised official

Article 278 CPC rests on a simple rule: a written notice of suspicion is served on the day it is drawn up, by an investigator or a prosecutor, and only where such service is impossible is it delivered in the manner the Code prescribes for the service of notices generally. Post, e-mail, delivery through an adult family member or through the person’s employer (Article 135 CPC, to which Article 111 refers) are therefore not an equivalent alternative but a fallback for cases where personal service cannot be effected. A detained person must be served within 24 hours of apprehension, failing which they must be released immediately. And immediately after notification, the date, time and legal qualification are entered in the Unified Register of Pre-Trial Investigations, known by its Ukrainian acronym ERDR (Article 278(4)).

Back to the case. According to Yurii Bauman, the notice was not served in person: “The whole country knows where Kryvonos is, so the only lawful way is to serve him personally. Instead, the notice was sent to NABU’s registry office ‘for transmission to S. Yu. Kryvonos’ — in other words, the Director of NABU is being invited to organise the service of a notice of suspicion on himself. As head of the institution he could, of course, mark it ‘for action’, but he is hardly likely to.” Neither “impossibility of service” nor “whereabouts unknown” — the only two legal grounds for replacing personal service with another method — existed on these facts.

What the Supreme Court says: the safeguard lies in the signature, and service can be delegated

The question of who may serve a notice of suspicion on a specially protected person has followed an instructive path in the case law of the Supreme Court of Ukraine. We cite only decisions whose texts we have verified in the Unified State Register of Court Decisions.

In its judgment of 19 February 2019 in case No. 349/1487/14-к, the Criminal Cassation Court considered proceedings against a judge who had been served with a notice of suspicion by an official who was neither the Prosecutor General nor a Deputy Prosecutor General. The court held this to be a material breach of procedural law and dismissed the prosecutor’s cassation appeal: a judge may be notified of suspicion only by the Prosecutor General or a Deputy, and that act cannot be delegated. A corruption prosecution collapsed not because the evidence was weak but because service was defective.

On 11 December 2019, in case No. 536/2475/14-к (proceedings No. 13-34кс19), the Grand Chamber of the Supreme Court refined the approach. A written notice of suspicion against a judge, “which entails the approval and subsequent signing of that procedural document, may be effected only by the Prosecutor General or a Deputy Prosecutor General”. But the Prosecutor General or a Deputy may instruct an investigator or another prosecutor to physically hand the document over: the guarantee of judicial independence operates at the stage of decision-making and signature, not at the moment sheets of paper change hands. Tellingly, the legislature soon wrote that logic directly into Article 481(2) CPC: the Prosecutor General, a Deputy or the head of a regional prosecutor’s office may instruct other prosecutors to effect written notification of suspicion in the manner prescribed by Article 278(1) and (2).

That position remains good law and is applied to this day. In its judgment of 7 May 2026 in case No. 344/16572/13-к (proceedings No. 51-3586км25), the Criminal Cassation Court, relying expressly on the Grand Chamber’s conclusion, set aside a ruling of the court of appeal that had acquitted an advocate because the notice had been handed to him by an investigator: since the notice had been drawn up and signed by the prosecutor authorised under Article 481 CPC, its physical delivery by an investigator from the assigned team breached neither the guarantees of the legal profession nor the procedure for notification of suspicion.

It was this line of authority that Yurii Bauman invoked in his comment to LB.ua: “The Supreme Court explained back in 2019 that a notice of suspicion against a specially protected person may be signed only by the authorised official, while it may be served, on that official’s instruction, by an investigator or a prosecutor from the team. The suspect’s employer is nowhere on that list. There is a signature, but there is no suspect.” The registry office of the very institution headed by the addressee is neither an investigator nor a prosecutor, and no instruction from the Prosecutor General can turn it into a lawful agent of service.

The price of a defective notice: why this matters to business

One might think it makes little difference: signed now, served later. The difference is fundamental, and it cuts both ways.

Until a person has acquired the status of suspect, no measure of restraint can be imposed on them, they cannot be suspended from office, and no indictment can be brought. Nor do the post-notification time limits for the pre-trial investigation begin to run, since the Code counts them from the day of notification (Article 219 CPC). But the reverse is also true: without the status of suspect, a person has no right of access to the case file, no right to challenge the notice before an investigating judge (Article 303(1)(10) CPC allows this once two months have elapsed from notification of suspicion of a crime), and none of the toolkit of defence rights that a notice of suspicion unlocks. A suspicion that has been announced publicly but never served leaves a person in the worst of all positions: the reputational consequences have already arrived, while the procedural rights have not.

For a business owner or a senior executive this translates into very concrete things. Banks, insurers, foreign counterparties, tender committees and compliance departments react to the news, not to the acknowledgment of receipt. Key-person clauses in loan agreements and investment documents, change-of-control provisions and fit-and-proper requirements in regulated industries are triggered by a media report. The first task of the legal team faced with an “announced” suspicion is therefore not to rebut the substance but to establish the procedural fact: does a notice exist at all, who signed it, did that person hold the requisite authority on the date of signature, who served it and by what method, and what was entered in the ERDR and when.

It is equally important to understand what a notice of suspicion does not give and does not take away. A search of company premises, temporary access to documents and the seizure of assets are all possible without any suspect — on the ruling of an investigating judge in proceedings in which no one has yet been notified of suspicion. The absence of a notice against the chief executive therefore does not mean that the company is out of the danger zone, and a dawn-raid protocol should exist regardless of whether anyone in management appears in the register.

The case of the week: chronology and Yurii Bauman’s position

A brief reconstruction of events from public sources. In early September, NABU and SAPO conducted an operation in the course of which a deputy head of a department of the Office of the Prosecutor General was detained. On Saturday, 12 September, Prosecutor General Ruslan Kravchenko signed two notices of suspicion — one against NABU Director Semen Kryvonos and one against an unnamed “confidant of the head of SAPO”. Before dawn he crossed the border, and on the morning of 14 September he announced the notices in a video address. NABU stated the same day that no notice had been served on its Director. The President suspended the Prosecutor General by decree and called on Parliament to dismiss him. On the evening of 14 September the Office of the Prosecutor General issued a statement: in the relevant proceedings no person had been notified of suspicion in the manner prescribed by the CPC, there were no legal grounds for such notification, and the entries in the ERDR had been annulled. On 15 September the Verkhovna Rada dismissed Ruslan Kravchenko by 317 votes.

In his comment to LB.ua on 14 September, Yurii Bauman separated three questions that public debate kept conflating: the lawfulness of the signature, the existence of service, and the consequences for the successor. Resignation, he said, does not cancel the notice but shifts the decision to whoever comes next: “The suspicion does not disappear; a prosecutor’s dismissal does not annul his procedural decisions. But an unserved notice is a piece of paper waiting to be handed over. It must be served either by the new Prosecutor General (or acting Prosecutor General) or by a prosecutor on his instruction. In other words, Kravchenko has left his successor not a suspicion but a choice: serve it and you have ‘continued the attack’; don’t, and you have ‘covered it up’. That is not a procedural document. It is a suitcase without a handle, signed on the way out.”

Separately, he drew attention to the gap between the public description of the second notice and its actual legal qualification under Article 190 of the Criminal Code (fraud), rather than the provisions on trading in influence or offering an undue advantage: “The qualification does not match the public narrative, and that usually means the narrative was written for the microphone and the qualification for the investigating judge.” The conclusion of his comment deserves to be quoted in full, because it applies well beyond this case:

“By the letter of the law, Kravchenko’s signature is lawful, the service is not, and the consequences lie in the hands of whoever takes the chair on Riznytska Street after 15 September. A criminal case begins not with a video address but with an acknowledgment of receipt. So far, no one has produced one.”

Yurii Bauman, comment to Livyi Bereh (LB.ua), 14 September 2026 (translated from the Ukrainian)

The statement by the Office of the Prosecutor General added a further dimension, which Yurii Bauman addressed on Espreso TV (as reported by ADVOKAT POST on 17 September). The former Prosecutor General insists that he signed the notice, entered the information in the ERDR and dispatched the document in the prescribed manner; his Office maintains that no proper notification took place and that the register entries have been annulled. One of those statements is untrue, and which one is a matter not for the media but for an inquiry. “If there was no notice — that is, if it does not correspond to the case file and the case file contains no such notice, as the Office of the Prosecutor General asserts — then the question arises of grounds for disciplinary liability of the former Prosecutor General Kravchenko,” he said. And further: “On closer examination this may turn out to amount to a criminal offence. If a state body says there was no notice of suspicion, while an individual publishes a document and says that it is one, are those not the hallmarks of conduct that may constitute an offence?” An important caveat: he named no specific article of the Criminal Code. This was an assessment of the need for an inquiry, not an assertion that an offence had been committed.

The mechanism for such an inquiry, in his view, is equally clear: the General Inspectorate of the Office of the Prosecutor General should establish who had access to the relevant ERDR data, who entered the information and who subsequently altered it; the Qualification and Disciplinary Commission of Prosecutors should deliver its own conclusion; and the basis for the order authorising the foreign business trip should be examined separately. “There has to be an internal review, and it has to be made public. The Qualification and Disciplinary Commission of Prosecutors has to reach its own conclusion,” he stressed.

An unconventional angle: can a signed notice be “cancelled”?

The announcement that the ERDR entries had been “annulled” raises a question to which the Code gives no direct answer. The CPC knows no procedure by which a prosecutor’s successor “cancels” a notice signed by his predecessor. There is amendment of the notice (Article 279), closure of the proceedings (Article 284) and a finding by an investigating judge, on the suspect’s complaint, that the suspicion is unfounded (Article 303(1)(10)). An entry in the ERDR, by contrast, is not a free-standing decision but a derivative record made after notification has taken place (Article 278(4)). If there was no service, there should have been no entry; removing it is not “cancelling the suspicion” but correcting the register. And then the question of who entered a record of a notification that never happened, when and on what basis, ceases to be a question of procedure and becomes a question of the liability of named officials. That is precisely why Yurii Bauman insists on an audit of ERDR access rather than on public statements.

The second conclusion reaches beyond this case. The Supreme Court’s logic — the safeguard lies in the signature, service is a technical act — protects the prosecution from formalistic objections about who physically handed over the pages. But the same logic means that a signature, however impeccably lawful, produces no legal consequence whatsoever until proper service has occurred, and that a defect in service can destroy even a substantively strong prosecution, as it did in the 2019 case. Procedural formalism cuts both ways, and the defence must be able to wield it as confidently as the prosecution.

What owners, executives and politicians should take from this

If you or a member of your team learn of a “suspicion” from the news, a journalist’s call or a message from a counterparty, the first step is not a statement but the legal fixing of facts. Establish whether a notice exists as a document; who signed it and whether that person falls within the circle authorised for your status; on what day and by what method service was attempted; and whether the ERDR contains a record of notification and under what date. Each of these circumstances is either a potential ground for the defence or, conversely, a signal that the process is already moving and time is working against you.

At the moment of service itself, it is essential not to give any explanation on the merits without defence counsel; to obtain a copy of the document and the written notice of rights; to record who effected service and on whose instruction; and to sign nothing other than the acknowledgment of receipt, if you decide to sign that at all. Refusing to sign does not undo service, but a signature given under stress can become evidence.

At company level, a notice of suspicion against a senior manager is a corporate-governance event, not merely a personal problem: the board or the partners must be informed, key-person clauses in contracts reviewed, communications with the bank and the most important counterparties prepared, directors’ and officers’ insurance cover assessed and, above all, the individual’s defence separated from the defence of the business — they involve different lawyers, different interests and different risks. For public figures there is an additional layer: verifying that the document was signed by the very official designated in Article 481 CPC, and that the official held that authority on that date, is the first thing a competent defence lawyer will do — and, as the Supreme Court’s case law shows, it is sometimes enough on its own.

The position of Bauman Kondratyuk Attorneys Association

We take no view on the political expediency of the decisions taken in this affair and draw no conclusions about the guilt or innocence of anyone involved. Our position concerns process: a notice of suspicion is not an instrument of public communication but a procedural act with a designated signatory, a prescribed method of service and a defined moment at which legal consequences arise. When that procedure is disregarded by officials at the highest level, the price is paid not only by one individual but by trust in the institution itself — and, with it, by every entrepreneur who will next be “served with a suspicion” on the evening news.

Bauman Kondratyuk Attorneys Association defends business owners, senior executives and public figures at every stage of criminal proceedings in Ukraine — from the first signs of law-enforcement interest to cassation before the Supreme Court. We recommend having a plan in place before it is needed. Contact us to discuss your situation in confidence; we advise in English, Ukrainian, Polish and Lithuanian.

Frequently asked questions

From what moment does a person become a suspect in Ukraine?

From the moment a written notice of suspicion is served on them in the prescribed manner, or from the moment of apprehension on suspicion of a criminal offence. The one exception is where the person’s whereabouts cannot be established but steps have been taken to serve the notice in the manner prescribed for the service of notices (Article 42(1) CPC). The mere signing of the document, or a public statement about it, creates no suspect status.

Can a notice of suspicion be sent by post or through an employer?

Only if personal service on the day of issue is impossible (Article 278(1) CPC). In that event the general procedure for the service of notices under Article 135 CPC applies: post, e-mail, delivery to an adult family member or to the administration at the person’s place of work. If the person is available and their whereabouts are known, replacing personal service with a dispatch “for transmission” is a breach of the notification procedure.

Who must sign a notice of suspicion against a company director, and who against an MP or a judge?

For ordinary persons, including business executives, an investigator with the prosecutor’s approval, or the prosecutor (Article 277 CPC). For specially protected persons under Article 481 CPC — advocates, members of Parliament, judges, NABU and SAPO officers, the Prosecutor General — the signatory is the Prosecutor General, a Deputy Prosecutor General or the head of a regional prosecutor’s office, depending on the category. The signed document may be physically served, on instruction, by another prosecutor or an investigator from the team, as the Grand Chamber of the Supreme Court held in case No. 536/2475/14-к and as was reaffirmed in 2026.

Can a notice of suspicion be challenged?

Yes, but not immediately. Article 303(1)(10) CPC allows the suspect, their defence counsel or legal representative to challenge the notice before an investigating judge once one month has elapsed from notification of suspicion of a criminal misdemeanour, or two months in the case of a crime, but no later than the closure of the proceedings or the referral of the indictment to court. Until then, defects in the notice are recorded and deployed in hearings on measures of restraint, suspension from office and other applications.

Sources

Comment by Yurii Bauman for the Ukrainian online outlet Livyi Bereh (LB.ua): Anna Steshenko, “A farewell notice of suspicion for NABU Director Kryvonos: is Kravchenko acting lawfully, and what will the political consequences be” (in Ukrainian), LB.ua, 14 September 2026.

Yurii Bauman’s remarks on Espreso TV’s programme What Next?, as reported by ADVOKAT POST: “Kravchenko’s actions in the Kryvonos suspicion case must be examined; questions of criminal liability may arise — advocate Bauman” (in Ukrainian), ADVOKAT POST, 17 September 2026.

Court decisions are cited from the texts published in the Unified State Register of Court Decisions of Ukraine. Quotations are the authors’ translations from the Ukrainian originals. This article is provided for general information only and does not constitute legal advice on any specific matter. The audio summary on this page is narrated by a synthesised voice and condenses the article; in case of any discrepancy, the written text prevails.

Сообщение A Signature Is Not a Suspicion: What Business Owners, Politicians and Executives Should Know About Ukraine’s Notice of Suspicion появились сначала на Bauman Kondratyuk.

A Law That Confers Status, Not a Privilege

The cornerstone was laid in the summer of 2025. The Law “On Veteran Entrepreneurship” (No. 4563-IX), passed on 31 July 2025 and in force since 26 February 2026, is the first in Ukrainian law to grant veteran-run business a distinct legal status. Before it, a veteran entrepreneur was simply an entrepreneur; now he is a “subject of veteran entrepreneurship,” a status conferred for five years.

The logic of the law is subtler than the public slogans suggest. It introduces no tax holidays and does not exempt veteran business from VAT—a point worth stressing, because it is the source of the most common misconception. What the law does instead is create a status and a framework of access. The state, in effect, says: here is a separate till, here is a separate door, here are opportunities reserved for you; come in. The volume of financial support is fixed at 10% of the budgets of the relevant funds. Beneficiaries gain access to reserved public contracts, preferential leasing of state and municipal property, and reduced fees for registering inventions and trademarks. Local councils are permitted to adopt their own support programmes.

One striking provision allows for the priority engagement of veteran enterprises in state and regional procurement through contracts reserved at up to 5% of the relevant budget programmes—an idea borrowed, in part, from the United States. Its practical implementation, however, depends on separate procurement regulation.

The design is sound in principle. Rather than scattering privileges across the whole economy, the state defines the circle of those the support is meant for and builds a dedicated infrastructure around them. Status is acquired, for the most part, automatically through Diia, the national digital-services platform, on the basis of the Register of Veteran Entrepreneurship.

Yet this is where the first crack appears. The law works only as well as the Register works, and the Register’s technical readiness at the moment the law took effect remained in doubt. Automatic conferral of status is an elegant idea—but only for as long as the automatic mechanism does not stumble over identification errors. Moreover, status itself is not the same as a right to any particular programme: one can be a subject of veteran entrepreneurship and still fail to win a grant, and, conversely, secure a grant without holding the status at all. The rules for acquiring status and the rules for accessing finance exist separately, and it is easy to become lost in the gap between them.

The law did not appear on its own. Over several months, secondary legislation was adopted to implement it: the procedure for acquiring and terminating status, the updated mechanism for automatic conferral through Diia with access to reserved contracts, and a separate procedure for clawing back support should status be lost. The system was assembled after the law was passed—and in places it shows.

A Map of the Money

To judge the architecture, one must first grasp its scale—and the scale is genuinely considerable.

The most visible component is the non-repayable grant. The flagship is the eRobota (“eWork”) programme. Its veteran stream offers grants at three levels—up to 250,000, 500,000 or one million hryvnia—depending on the recipient’s job-creation commitments (one, two or four positions respectively). The largest sum comes at a price: the million-hryvnia grant requires 30% co-financing from the applicant’s own funds and an active sole-trader registration of at least a year. Alongside it runs “Own Business” (Vlasna Sprava), offering micro-grants of 50,000 to 250,000 hryvnia—and 75,000 for those who merely intend to register as a sole trader, with no mandatory job-creation requirement. There are also sector-specific streams with higher ceilings: “Own Garden” and “Own Greenhouse” reach up to eight million hryvnia, the creative industries from 100,000 to one million, with separate terms for processing and IT.

On a single application, the veteran stream of eRobota provides up to 1m hryvnia. This is a grant, not a loan: there is no interest, and no repayment is required provided the contract is honoured. For the maximum sum, the applicant must have been a registered sole trader for at least twelve months, create four jobs, and finance at least 30% of the project themselves; the state covers the other 70%.

Having paid the taxes, duties and unified social contribution due on the first grant, a recipient may apply once more for an additional grant under the general rules.

In aggregate, then, support may reach 2m hryvnia—but not at once, and with no guarantee of a second approval.

The second channel is the “Varto” (“Worth It”) competition run by the Ukrainian Veterans Fund. Here the sums are larger: a budget grant of 500,000 to 1.5m hryvnia, and on certain streams up to 3m—but the selection is stricter. On average three or four applicants compete for each place; then come a technical screening, assessment by independent experts, an interview and the reworking of the business plan. A repeat grant is available no sooner than three years later, and only in a different field. For those who need not hundreds of thousands but a few tens of thousands, the fund also offers micro-financing: a one-off reimbursement of up to 20,000 hryvnia for equipment already purchased.

Where a grant is not enough, the soft loan begins. The “Affordable Loans 5-7-9%” programme lends up to 50m hryvnia over three to five years at a rate of 5, 7 or 9%, with the rate falling by half a percentage point for each new job created—though not below five. For zones of high wartime risk, a 1% rate applies to investment purposes during the first two years. The logic is straightforward: the grant supplies the starting capital, the loan the funds to scale. So that a business without collateral can obtain credit at all, the state provides portfolio guarantees covering up to 50% of the risk for an existing business and up to 80% for a new one. Discounted leasing and factoring follow the same compensation logic.

Finally, there is non-state money. Donors often offer smaller sums, but pair them with mandatory training. DVV International, funded by Germany’s foreign ministry, provides up to 400,000 hryvnia—but only after the applicant completes a course. The UNDP finances the economic recovery of small business with a priority for veterans. IREX, backed by the US State Department, runs its own reintegration programme. Large companies—Kernel, SKELAR and MHP among them—co-finance the veterans’ fund competitions.

The experts’ advice is to combine: a grant as starting capital, a soft loan for growth, donor training as support. There is only one caveat, ignorance of which can prove costly: two state grants may not be received at once. Together these channels form a support system that most states have yet even to legislate, while Ukraine is already disbursing money. The safe is full. The question is whether an instruction manual was included with it.

How a Veteran Gets the Money: Step by Step

Picture a veteran, newly demobilised, holding a combat-participant’s certificate and hoping to open a small workshop. What path must he actually travel?

Step one—status and proof. Everything begins with a document establishing the entitlement: a combat-participant’s certificate, a certificate of war-related disability, or the status of a family member of a fallen defender. Separately comes the status of a subject of veteran entrepreneurship, which should for the most part be conferred automatically through Diia on the basis of the Register; if the automatic mechanism fails, an application may be sent to the Ministry of Veterans Affairs by email, signed with a qualified electronic signature. It is here that the first typical refusal can occur—not on the merits, but on a documentary defect: the wrong document, an out-of-date certificate, a discrepancy in the data.

Step two—choosing a programme and a sober calculation. The programmes differ substantially in their terms. “Own Business” is the most accessible option for a beginner: 50,000–250,000 hryvnia, or 75,000 on condition of registering as a sole trader. The eRobota veteran grant offers larger sums but heavier job-creation obligations. The “Varto” competition brings the largest sums and the strictest selection. This is where the decision is made that will shape everything that follows: how many jobs the applicant can realistically sustain, whether he can muster the 30% co-financing for a million-hryvnia grant, and whether he can outcompete three or four rivals for each place.

Step three—the business plan. This is the heart of the application and, at the same time, its most vulnerable part. For eRobota it is submitted on an official template: the portal offers both a blank form and a completed sample. The plan must be not impressive but realistic—market prices, a defensible financial model, a well-chosen location. It is here that most are weeded out: not for political reasons, but through doubtful calculations and a financial model that fails to inspire confidence. A weak business plan is the chief reason available financing goes unclaimed.

Step four—submission. The eRobota veteran grant is submitted online through Diia: authorisation via BankID or electronic signature, completion of the application, upload of the business plan, and signing with an electronic key. The application is reviewed by the State Employment Centre, roughly within ten working days of the deadline. “Varto” works differently. The applicant submits a package of documents—a project timeline, a management structure, a detailed application, a budget—followed by a technical check lasting several days, a window to remedy shortcomings, then some two weeks of independent expert assessment and an interview. The 5-7-9 soft loan runs not through the portal but through an authorised bank: the national development institution compensates the rate, while the decision on the loan itself is taken by the bank under its own standard procedures.

Step five—the decision, the contract and the most important signature. Once approved, an eRobota winner has roughly twenty working days to open an account at Oshchadbank and sign the contract; it is into this account that the funds will arrive. Before signing, one must determine the tax treatment of this particular programme: eRobota grants are not subject to personal income tax, the military levy or the single tax on the aid itself, whereas for funds from other providers the consequences depend on the source of financing, the recipient’s status and the existence of a specific tax exemption.

Step six—the money has arrived, the work has begun. Funds may be used only in accordance with the budget. Jobs tied to a veteran grant must be created within six months and preserved for a set period—two, four or six years, depending on the sum. Wages, social contributions, income tax and the military levy must all be paid in full and on time, for this is a condition of keeping the grant. To buy equipment other than that provided for in the budget, one needs the provider’s written consent: an unauthorised change in the direction of spending is already a breach.

Step seven—the reporting that is underestimated. Interim and final reports, source documents for every hryvnia, proof of the jobs created and, for “Varto,” monthly reports against the timeline besides. This is no formality. It is here that poor record-keeping turns first into a demand to return the money and, where state funds have been misused, into criminal exposure. A veteran who has travelled all seven steps and, at the seventh, failed to keep his source documents may lose more than one who never applied at all.

Seven steps—and at each there is a fork where it is easy to leave the road. The money is there in the system. But the way to it runs through applications, deadlines and tax traps, and there is no clear signpost along it.

Where the Risk Hides

The conceptual document that sets out the system’s generosity also isolates seven clusters of problems.

The most dangerous is the tax risk—yet there is no universal “zero versus 23%” formula here. State grants under the eRobota programme are not included in an individual’s taxable income or in the income of a single-tax payer, so no personal income tax, military levy or single tax is paid on the grant sum itself. This does not, however, relieve the business of the taxes on employees’ wages, or of tax on income earned from the business activity itself.

Other grants—particularly those from charitable or international organisations—require a separate tax assessment. For an individual or sole trader, funds not directly linked to the sale of goods or services and not covered by a specific exemption are ordinarily taxed as personal income: 18% income tax and a 5% military levy. For legal entities, the consequences depend on the tax regime and the rules of accounting. Decisive, therefore, is not the word “grant” but the recipient’s status, the source of the funds, the terms of the programme and the use to which the money is put.

Next comes intended use and reporting—and here the risks are higher still. For the misuse of state funds the consequences do not stop at a demand to return the money: a criminal characterisation is possible, the precise article depending on the circumstances. An error in a report ceases to be an accounting matter and becomes a legal risk of a wholly different order.

Other clusters of problems raise further barriers. The applicant’s status: who exactly must be the veteran—owner, co-owner, director; whether family members qualify; what share of ownership is required. Access to the funds: fierce competition, multi-stage selection, the 30% co-financing requirement for the largest sums, and the ban on combining two state grants. Job obligations: positions must not merely be created but retained. The clawback of support and loss of status: a separate procedure, separate consequences, and a question of the proportionality of sanctions that has yet to be worked out.

And finally, the one closest to lawyers—appeals. A refusal of a grant, the stripping of status, a demand to return funds: these are challenged, for the most part, through administrative proceedings. Here it is worth being candid and direct: settled Supreme Court practice on the new status of a subject of veteran entrepreneurship does not yet exist—the law and its secondary acts are too new to cite specific rulings by number. The existing Supreme Court positions concern adjacent questions: the characterisation of grants for tax purposes and the misuse of budget funds. The practice on veteran status itself will be shaped by the first cases. The first applicants will, in effect, form it through their own experience.

The World Has Already Run This Experiment

Ukraine is not the first country to build an economic bridge for those returning from war. The most developed and instructive precedent here is the American one. It repays close attention, for it shows both sides at once: how such a programme can transform a country, and how it can fail the very people it was meant to help.

The classic was written on a napkin. In the summer of 1944, with the war still under way, Harry Colmery—a former national commander of the American Legion—drafted, in Washington’s Mayflower Hotel, the first sketch of what would enter history as the G.I. Bill, and in the statute as the Servicemen’s Readjustment Act of 1944. Behind it stood the American Legion, with all its political weight; in the history of the veterans’ movement John Stelle was called the law’s “father,” and Congresswoman Edith Nourse Rogers, its co-author, its “mother.” President Roosevelt had at first wanted something more modest: means tests, and a full college course only for those who scored highest on examinations. The Legion insisted otherwise—full payments to all veterans, regardless of means. Universality won, and in that lay the whole design: to reward everyone who had served, and not to repeat the humiliation of the First World War veterans, kept waiting for years for benefits they had been promised.

What did the law, signed on 22 June 1944, actually provide? Tuition and a living stipend, from school to college and vocational training. A preferential mortgage on housing, with better terms for new construction. Low-interest loans for a business or a farm. And the “52-20 Club”—twenty dollars a week for a year for those seeking work. The payments were untaxed. The conditions were simple: at least ninety days of service and no dishonourable discharge.

The scale was unprecedented. By 1956, 7.8 million veterans had used the education benefits—2.2 million entered colleges and universities, a further 5.6 million trained under other programmes. That was roughly half of all sixteen million Second World War veterans. Through the state-guaranteed mortgage programme, nearly 2.4 million of them bought homes before 1952 alone. Historians and economists are all but unanimous: the law was one of the greatest investments in American human capital and helped fuel the post-war boom. Tellingly, the “52-20 Club” was barely needed: less than a fifth of the money set aside for it was spent—people quickly found work or went to study. The funds for passive support went unused, because the active channels worked.

But this history has a dark side, one Ukraine would do well to reflect on with particular care. Access was unequal. The law was written so as not to conflict with the segregation statutes of the South; through the discrimination of local authorities and private institutions in housing and education, Black veterans were largely left outside doors that stood wide open for white ones. The Columbia University historian Ira Katznelson called it “affirmative action for whites.” The lesson is harsh and simple: generosity without equal access deepens inequality rather than dispelling it. Narrow or arbitrary doors devalue any sum—the money is there, but the person for whom it is intended cannot reach it.

The American system did not stop in 1944—it works still, and its modern part is, for Ukraine, even more instructive than the classic. The state long ago grasped that a veteran entrepreneur needs not only money but guidance and demand. And so the Office of Veterans Business Development, within the federal Small Business Administration (SBA), runs a whole array of training programmes. “Boots to Business” delivers entrepreneurial training directly on military bases, within the Transition Assistance Program; its “Reboot” extends the course to veterans of all generations; “Revenue Readiness” is a six-week online course in building a business model; and there are dedicated programmes for women veterans and for veterans with disabilities. Across the country, Veterans Business Outreach Centers offer business-plan analysis, mentoring and practical workshops. There is even a dedicated loan for when a reservist is mobilised and the business suffers—the Military Reservist Economic Injury Disaster Loan.

The most interesting part is demand. Rather than merely giving the veteran money, the American state itself buys goods and services from his company. The federal government sets a target: a certain share of public procurement must go to Service-Disabled Veteran-Owned Small Businesses. The target is written into the base Small Business Act; long set at 3%, it was raised to 5% at the end of 2023 by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024. Such firms are entitled to procurement reserved exclusively for them, up to sole-source contracts without competition; today some twelve thousand veteran entrepreneurs hold federal contracts. This is a fundamentally different philosophy of support: not merely to supply starting capital, but to create guaranteed demand. It is precisely this instrument that Ukrainians have written into their law—”reserved public contracts”—but fixed as a norm that has yet to be filled with practice.

Britain demonstrates the same principle on a smaller scale. Veteran business there is financed through the British Business Bank and its partner organisation, X-Forces Enterprise. The figures are modest: some three thousand enterprises since 2013, £33.5m, roughly ten thousand jobs. But the point is not the sum. Along with the loan, the veteran receives a business adviser who helps draw up a plan and calculate cash flow, and mentoring support through the first year after launch. Finance comes with navigation—and that is what changes the outcome.

The opposite pole is where the money was given but the navigation was missing. After its 2016 peace agreement, Colombia offered former combatants a clear package: a one-off starting capital of eight million pesos—about 2,500 dollars—for a productive project, plus a monthly payment at 90% of the minimum wage, at first for two years and later extended. There was an individual path and a collective one. The result fell short of the intention. The state acted slowly—by the end of the Santos government’s term only two collective productive projects had been approved, while a single non-governmental initiative was already supporting 42. Perhaps a sixth of participants, by some estimates, were drawn into productive projects. The money was offered; far from all made use of it.

The wider international experience reduces to a single, recurring proposition. In the lessons drawn from disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programmes, from the Balkans to Africa, economic reintegration is consistently named the “weakest link.” Money on its own does not work. The typical mistake is to train everyone in the same trade without assessing local demand, so that the market is swiftly saturated. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, of more than a hundred thousand demobilised, economic reintegration was secured for only 58%—and that amid a shortage of funds. A post-war economy rarely creates jobs on the scale the authors of such programmes assume.

The Pluses, the Minuses and What to Do About Them

The combination of American breadth, British navigation and Colombian gaps shows the Ukrainian system in a clear but fair light. It should be neither extolled nor written off. It should be judged without illusions.

The pluses are real and weighty. Speed—eighteen months from the first dedicated law to the launch of grant programmes; few states move so fast. Breadth: grants from 50,000 to eight million hryvnia, loans up to 50 million, guarantees, leasing, donor money and corporate co-financing cover almost the whole spectrum of need, from launching a small business to a capital-intensive project. A distinct legal category for veteran business is exactly the conceptual solution that international practice took decades to arrive at. And the reserved contracts written into the law are, in essence, a Ukrainian version of the American bet on demand—the most powerful instrument known, if it is filled with practice.

The minuses are real too, and nearly all of them are about design, not the size of the purse.

The tax risk does not arise equally for every grant: state eRobota grants are untaxed, whereas funds from other providers may generate taxable income depending on the source, the recipient’s status and the terms of the programme. Because of the risk of criminal liability for misuse, even an error in a report may carry consequences out of all proportion to the fault. Fierce competition and 30% co-financing screen out the most vulnerable—the very people for whom the system was built. And the Register’s technical unreadiness casts doubt on the automatic conferral of status.

At the same time the system lacks the navigational link that other countries either created in good time or paid dearly for the absence of. A British veteran who needs help managing cash flow telephones his adviser.

The Ukrainian one risks learning of his mistake from the tax authority or an investigator.

The directions for a solution are suggested both by the list of problems and by international experience. Unify the tax rules for non-budgetary grants, so their consequences are clear before the contract is signed. Ensure the Register is technically ready before relying on automatic conferral of status. Simplify and standardise reporting, and make sanctions proportionate, so that an accounting slip does not drag criminal consequences in its wake. Turn reserved contracts into a working mechanism: this is Ukraine’s own 5% bet on demand, and it deserves more than a line in a statute. Assess local demand before financing the same activity en masse, so as not to repeat another country’s saturation. And, above all, build the missing navigational link: an adviser, a mentor, a simple reporting form, and a lawyer who determines the tax treatment of a given programme before the contract is signed.

The success of this system will be measured not in the hryvnia that left the budget, but in the businesses still trading three years from now.

The Position of Bauman Kondratyuk Attorneys at Law

Veteran financing is not merely about the size of the grant; it is about the right design of access to it. The greatest risks arise not where there is little money, but where a clear signpost is missing—in the tax characterisation of the funds, in the reporting, and in the limits of intended use. It is precisely here that an accounting slip can turn into a demand to return the money and, at times, into criminal exposure.

A veteran entrepreneur would be well advised to determine the tax treatment of a specific programme before signing the contract (this is part of what legal support for veteran business means), to keep source documentation for every hryvnia, and to retain proof of the jobs created. And should a dispute arise—a refused grant, a stripped status or a demand to return funds—this is a matter for administrative proceedings, where documents and precise legal argument are decisive.

Frequently Asked Questions

Does the status of a veteran-entrepreneurship subject exempt one from taxes?

No. The law introduces no tax holidays and grants no VAT exemption. It confers a distinct legal status and a framework of access to reserved contracts, preferential leasing and reduced fees. eRobota grants are untaxed, but this does not relieve the business of taxes on employees’ wages or on income from its activity.

How much can a veteran entrepreneur receive?

The range is wide: micro-grants from 50,000 hryvnia, the eRobota veteran grant up to one million, “Varto” competitions up to three million, sector streams up to eight million, and 5-7-9% soft loans up to 50 million. Two state grants may not be received at once.

What is the main risk when using a grant?

The misuse of funds and inadequate reporting. The consequences are not confined to returning the money—a criminal characterisation is possible. Source documents, adherence to the budget and the preservation of jobs are therefore critical.

This material is informational in nature and does not constitute individual legal advice. In every case the specific documents, facts and circumstances are decisive.

Legal Support for Veteran Business

Bauman Kondratyuk Attorneys at Law advises veteran businesses at every stage—from choosing a grant programme and the tax characterisation of funds to reporting and defence in disputes over clawbacks or the loss of status. Explore our services or get in touch to obtain advice before you sign the contract.

Source: this material by attorney Yurii Bauman was first published on the author’s blog at LB.ua—”Veteran business: between the generosity of the state and the difficulty of access” (14 July 2026). On the website of Bauman Kondratyuk Attorneys at Law the material is presented in an editorial adaptation.

Сообщение Ukraine’s Veteran Business: Between State Generosity and the Difficulty of Access появились сначала на Bauman Kondratyuk.

A case from the practice of Bauman Kondratyuk Attorneys Association showing how an accounting inaccuracy in tax reporting turned into criminal charges that carried up to 12 years in prison — and why, in matters like these, the facts, the documents and the precise legal classification are what ultimately decide the outcome.

When a Tax Inaccuracy Crosses Into Criminal Territory

In a tax dispute, businesses usually expect a familiar sequence of events: an audit report, written objections, and then an administrative or court appeal. Every so often, though, an accounting slip lands somewhere far more serious — in the realm of criminal law. When that happens, the cost of getting the legal classification wrong is measured in far more than the size of any additional assessment. It reaches a company’s reputation, the way it is run, and the personal freedom of the person at the top.

One such matter handled by Bauman Kondratyuk Attorneys Association concerned a VAT return for February 2022. On the surface, it looked like a narrow question about the order in which tax invoices were recorded in the return’s appendices. It ended as a criminal case in which the company’s director was accused of forgery in office and of misappropriating budget funds under martial law.

What Actually Happened

While preparing Appendix 3 to the VAT return, the company’s accountant entered the date on which the tax invoices were registered in the Unified Register of Tax Invoices — December 2021 — rather than the date on which they were actually included in the return, January 2022. That single choice created a discrepancy between the figures in Appendices 2 and 3. The amount of that discrepancy was then factored into the VAT refund that was paid out to the company.

Context mattered enormously here. A desk audit by the State Tax Service in September 2022 found no violations. A later scheduled on-site documentary audit, carried out in May 2024, reached a telling conclusion: the rules governing the completion and filing of VAT reporting, approved by Order No. 21 of the Ministry of Finance of Ukraine dated 28 January 2016, set no specific sequence for reflecting a negative VAT balance across Appendices 2 and 3. In other words, the taxpayer is entitled to decide that sequence independently.

The Supreme Court had already taken the same view in its ruling of 27 January 2022 in case No. 640/23180/19. For the defence, this was no minor footnote — it was the key to reading the whole episode correctly. What had occurred was not a hidden scheme but an accounting and methodological situation arising from a sequence the regulations simply never spelled out.

Where the Criminal Risk Lay

In May 2025, the initial legal classification was extraordinarily severe:

• Part 1 of Article 366 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine — forgery in office, meaning the entry by an official of knowingly false information into official documents;
• Part 4 of Article 191 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine — misappropriation of another’s property by an official abusing their position, committed under martial law.

It was the second of these that exposed the director to the greatest danger. The sanction under Part 4 of Article 191 carries from 7 to 12 years’ imprisonment, an additional ban on holding certain positions or engaging in certain activities, and confiscation of property.

The dispute, therefore, was no longer a conversation about tax reporting. It had become a question about the very limits of criminal liability: can a technical or methodological inaccuracy in a return automatically be recast as the deliberate theft of public funds?

How the Defence Was Built

The defence strategy deliberately set aside any emotional response to the charges and focused on three fundamental legal questions: was there intent, what was the true nature of the discrepancy, and was there harm to state interests in the form that Article 191 actually requires?

First, the absence of intent. Forgery in office requires an awareness that the information is false and a deliberate wish to enter precisely that information into an official document. Article 191, in turn, requires direct intent to misappropriate another’s property, an awareness that the conduct is unlawful, and a desire for the resulting consequences. The defence consistently showed that none of these elements was borne out by the case file.

Second, the methodological nature of the discrepancy. The defence relied, among other things, on expert opinion No. 3866 of 7 February 2024 from the Bokarius National Scientific Centre of Forensic Expertise. It confirmed that the inconsistencies identified in the reporting were technical and methodological in character, stemming from the absence of any clearly defined sequence for reflecting the negative balance in Appendices 2 and 3 of the return.

Third, the lack of any proper factual basis for a finding of misappropriation. In cases of this kind it is not enough to point arithmetically to the amount of a discrepancy. The prosecution must prove harm, a causal link, the method of misappropriation, a self-interested motive and direct intent. These are precisely the elements that separate a tax or bookkeeping error from a criminal offence against property.

The Turning Point

After the documentary evidence had been examined, the expert opinions reviewed and the defendant questioned, the prosecutor drew up a revised indictment in April 2026. In it, the prosecution effectively conceded the absence of the very elements on which the original classification had rested:

“There is no evidence that the defendant was aware that the information entered into the VAT return was false, or that he acted with the aim of unlawfully misappropriating budget funds and desired such consequences. Instead, it has been established that… he improperly performed his official duties through a careless attitude towards them.”

The prosecution reclassified the charges from Part 1 of Article 366 and Part 4 of Article 191 of the Criminal Code to Part 1 of Article 367 — official negligence. For the defence this mattered not as a formal change of label, but as confirmation of the central point: without proven intent, a self-interested motive and properly established harm, a charge of misappropriating public funds cannot hold.

How the Case Ended

More than three years had passed since the events the prosecution tied to June 2022. To save time, the client decided to seek the closure of the criminal proceedings.

On 11 May 2026, the Sviatoshynskyi District Court of Kyiv granted the defence’s motion and closed the case. The costs of the expert examinations were charged to the state. The prosecutor’s civil claim for damages had already been returned back in July 2025.

What This Case Tells Businesses

This case should not be read as a universal recipe. Every matter turns on its own documents, facts, chronology and on how the parties conduct themselves procedurally. Even so, it illustrates a few practical points that matter for any business.

Legal classification is not a formality. The gap between a charge under Part 4 of Article 191 and one under Part 1 of Article 367 is a gap between entirely different legal regimes, different risks and different procedural consequences. That is why work on classification has to begin on day one — not once a case is already drifting toward a verdict.

A tax inaccuracy is not, in itself, a deliberate crime. Where the issue is accounting methodology, vague regulation or a technical slip, the defence has to demonstrate exactly that in the language of evidence: audit reports, expert findings, tax data, witness testimony and the internal logic of the bookkeeping.

A tax audit report can prove decisive in criminal proceedings. Where the competent supervisory authority finds no unlawful overstatement or loss to the budget, that does not automatically close the criminal question, but it weighs heavily on any assessment of the objective elements and of the alleged harm.

Time in the criminal process can cut both ways — against the defence and in its favour. The institution of limitation periods under Article 49 of the Criminal Code is procedurally important, but using it effectively depends on first getting the classification right.

The View of Bauman Kondratyuk Attorneys Association

For us, this case is no occasion for loud statements. It is an example of something we see often: in criminal-tax matters, the outcome is rarely shaped by a single procedural document. It is shaped by patient, sustained work with the facts, the law and the evidence.

A strong defence begins with a careful reading of the return, the audit report, the expert opinion and the indictment. It is usually in those documents that you can see where tax methodology ends and criminal law, properly speaking, begins.

When the charges against a business or its director look out of all proportion to the actual circumstances, the first place to look is the legal classification: has intent been proven, has harm been established, has a causal link been shown, and has the method of misappropriation been identified? It is often in these details that the future of a case is decided.

This material has been prepared on the basis of one of the cases from the practice of Bauman Kondratyuk Attorneys Association. The circumstances are described in general terms and without disclosing any information that may be protected by attorney-client privilege.

Сообщение A Technical Error in a VAT Return That Became a Criminal Case — and Why Legal Classification Decides Everything появились сначала на Bauman Kondratyuk.

Yurii Bauman

·9 November 2025

Case Summary

Following a scheduled on‑site audit, the Kyiv office of the State Tax Service assessed nearly UAH 2.7 million in additional liabilities (corporate income tax: UAH 2,301,203; VAT: UAH 287,586) and issued two Tax Notices and Decisions.

The Attorneys’ Association “Bauman Kondratyuk”  team — Yurii Bauman (Managing Partner) and Maria Koshova (Attorney) — delivered a dual success: they defeated the allegations of unreal transactions on the merits and stopped further appeal through precise procedural work, bringing the dispute to finality at the Supreme Court.

Facts of the Case and the SFS Position

The tax authority challenged the reality of consulting and information‑service contracts with a sole proprietor executed in 2018 and 2020, invoking clause 44.1 of Article 44 of the Tax Code and Law No. 996‑XIV (Accounting and Financial Reporting Law). It argued that the primary documents did not prove actual service delivery and that the contractor allegedly lacked the capacity to perform the work.

• Tax Notice: corporate income tax — UAH 2,301,203;
• Tax Notice: VAT — UAH 287,586;
• Total additional assessment with penalties — nearly UAH 2.7 million.

Victory on the Merits: Reality of Operations and Business Purpose

The defence shifted the focus from formal assumptions about the contractor to the real‑world facts of the client’s operations — the delivery of services, their use in business, and economic rationale.

• Actual provision: financial‑economic analysis, tax‑planning consulting, business‑development strategy, legal advice.
• Use in activity: documented links to management decisions and business processes.
• Business purpose: economic justification and real effect, aligned with contemporary case law.

On 25 April 2025, the Kyiv District Administrative Court (case No. 320/54***/2*) fully upheld the client’s claim.

The court found the SFS conclusions unfounded and held that the primary documents confirm both the provision of services and their connection to the taxpayer’s commercial activity.

Procedural Victory: Halting the Appeal

Disagreeing with the first‑instance decision, SFS Kyiv appealed to the Sixth Administrative Court of Appeal. The Bauman Kondratyuk team’s procedural precision prevented delay tactics.

1. 25 Jun 2025 — the appeal was returned (likely for unpaid court fee and/or missed deadline).
2. 19 Aug 2025 — the renewed appeal was left unprocessed due to deficiencies; 10 days allowed for correction.
3. 18 Sep 2025 — the court refused to restore the deadline and declined to open appellate proceedings.

Principles applied: equality of arms, good governance, and legal certainty (res judicata). The argument of “no budget appropriations” is unacceptable.

Supreme Court Finality

Unable to proceed on the merits in the appeal, SFS Kyiv filed a cassation appeal against the Sixth Administrative Court of Appeal’s ruling of 18 September 2025. On 3 November 2025, the Cassation Administrative Court of the Supreme Court (Judges: Shyshov O.O., Zheltobriukh I.L., Yakovenko M.M.) refused to open cassation proceedings in case No. 320/542**/2* (proceedings No. K/990/42***/25). This sealed the victory: the 25 April 2025 first‑instance judgment cancelling the Tax Notices became final and not subject to further appeal.

Business Implications

• Comprehensive approach: merits (reality/business purpose) plus procedural discipline.
• Practical outcome: not merely a “paper win” — legal finality.
• Recommendation: build evidence beyond primary documents to include proof of performance, use, links to decisions, and economic rationale.

Representation: Yurii Bauman and Maria Koshova, Bauman Kondratyuk Law Firm.

Frequently Asked Questions

Are primary documents alone sufficient?

No. Courts also evaluate actual performance, use in business activity, and business purpose.

Can SFS cite lack of budget appropriations to restore deadlines?

No. Case law rejects this: the state bears the same procedural obligations as taxpayers.

Which evidence best counters allegations of unreal transactions?

A holistic set: contracts, acceptance acts, proof of performance, links to business decisions, and economic justification.

Related Reading

• Tax Disputes
• Client Successes
• Contact Us

Need counsel in a tax dispute?

Contact us — we respond within one business day.
Office: 39/41 Shota Rustaveli St., Office 814, Kyiv · Email: office@bkadvisers.com.ua

Сообщение Success of the Attorneys’ Association “Bauman Kondratyuk” in Supreme Court dispute with the State tax service появились сначала на Bauman Kondratyuk.

Two Passports, One Homeland: What the Law on Multiple Citizenship Really Means for Ukrainians

After gaining independence in 1991, Ukraine faced the urgent task of building its own legal system, and one of its key elements was the institution of citizenship.Two Passports, One Homeland: What the Law on Multiple Citizenship Really Means for Ukrainians

The institution of single citizenship was conditioned by the historical context.

At the dawn of independence, the primary task was to assert sovereignty and prevent external influence—primarily from the Russian Federation, which actively used the “passport” tool to retain control over the post-Soviet space.

The principle of single citizenship was viewed as a safeguard against separatism and was a perennial hot topic on political talk shows.

Why Now? A Historical Paradox and the Imperatives of the Moment

For 33 years of independence, Ukraine lived with a legal paradox. Article 4 of the Constitution proclaims: “There is a single citizenship in Ukraine.”

For decades this sentence was interpreted as a ban on holding a second passport, although its actual meaning is different: in legal relations with Ukraine, the state recognizes you only as its citizen, ignoring your foreign passports.

Despite this, until recently the law provided for the possible loss of Ukrainian citizenship for voluntarily acquiring a foreign one.

This collision created a “gray zone” for millions—from descendants of the old diaspora to more recent labor migrants and refugees. De facto they were bipatrides; de jure—potential violators. The new law legalizes a person’s right to be a citizen of Ukraine and also of another country.

The full-scale Russian aggression in 2022 became the turning point. It is obvious that the millions of Ukrainians who found refuge abroad, as well as the powerful global diaspora, are not a threat but a tremendous asset to the state.

Accordingly, it became necessary to introduce legislative mechanisms that would allow for meaningful engagement with Ukrainians living outside Ukraine.

On 15 July 2025, the President of Ukraine signed the Law of Ukraine “On Amendments to Certain Laws of Ukraine to Ensure the Exercise of the Right to Acquire and Retain the Citizenship of Ukraine.” The law will officially take effect on 16 January 2026.

The new law does not open the door to everyone without exception. Its central regulatory element is an “approved list” of countries whose citizenship may be acquired without risking the loss of a Ukrainian passport.

This list is not static and is formed and updated by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine (as of now, such a list has not been approved).

However, on 26 August 2025, at a meeting with representatives of the Ukrainian World Congress, President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that such countries would include Germany, Poland, Czechia, the United States, and Canada.

Yet behind loud political statements lies a complex world of legal nuances.

Dual citizenship, or bipatrism, is a legal phenomenon that arises at the intersection of different national laws. Its source is in legal collisions where two or more states simultaneously, on the basis of their own laws, consider the same person to be their citizen.

In historical context, the true catalyst for rethinking came with the Second World War. Tens of millions were forced to leave their homes, making legal regulation of their status an urgent necessity.

A turning point was the British Nationality Act 1948. For the first time, it directly allowed that a Citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies (CUKC) could also be a citizen of another state, including a member of the Commonwealth.

What Will Holding Two Passports Mean in Practice? How to Divide Obligations Between Two States?

Where do you pay taxes, in whose army do you serve, and who will protect your rights when you are a citizen of the world with a Ukrainian heart?

Let us analyze what awaits Ukrainians who will also obtain passports of Germany, Czechia, Poland, Canada, and the United States—the countries named as priorities for implementing the new policy.

How It Will Work: Passports by the Rules

The new law is not an “open day” for all comers. It is a carefully regulated mechanism. Its heart is the “approved list” of countries to be formed by the Cabinet of Ministers. The criteria are clear: EU or G7 membership, active support for Ukraine, and the absence of security risks.

For citizens of these countries (and for Ukrainians acquiring their citizenship), the risk of losing the Ukrainian passport is removed. Foreigners seeking to become Ukrainians must reside in the country for a set period and pass examinations in language, history, and the Constitution.

At the same time, the law sets strict safeguards:

• A categorical ban on multiple citizenship with the aggressor state. Voluntarily obtaining a Russian passport is a direct ground for losing Ukrainian citizenship.
• Restrictions for public officials. Senior officials, judges, and law-enforcement officers, as before, may not hold dual citizenship.
• An immutable principle. On the territory of Ukraine you are only a citizen of Ukraine. This norm is the keystone for resolving all subsequent legal collisions.

One of the key—and previously absent—elements is the introduction of the duty to notify the competent authorities (likely the State Migration Service) about the acquisition of foreign citizenship.

Before adoption of the new law, Ukraine in practice had neither strict administrative nor criminal liability for failing to report a second passport.

For the new system to work, the legislation must set clear deadlines, forms for submitting such notice, and sanctions for failure to submit. Without these elements, the regulatory framework remains incomplete. On this point, the new law contains a legal gap.

Global Practice: Four Different Stories

To understand the future of Ukrainian bipatrides, it is worth looking at how this works in key partner countries.

Germany. Synchronized liberalization. Ukraine’s reform coincided remarkably in time with Germany’s. A law known as the Gesetz zur Modernisierung des Staatsangehörigkeitsrechts (StARModG) was adopted. As a result, as of 27 June 2024 Germany abolished the requirement to renounce one’s prior citizenship upon naturalization. This creates favorable conditions for hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian refugees, opening a direct path to dual citizenship without legal obstacles.

Poland and Czechia. European neighbors. Czechia allowed dual citizenship back in 2014, accumulating significant practical experience. Poland is also tolerant of bipatrides but imposes stricter integration requirements, including a mandatory Polish language exam at level B1.

USA. “It’s complicated.” America permits dual citizenship but does not officially encourage it. In Kawakita v. United States, 343 U.S. 717 (1952), the U.S. Supreme Court recognized that a person may “have and exercise rights of citizenship in two countries and be subject to the responsibilities of both.” However, the U.S. passport imposes unique, lifelong, and extraterritorial obligations that make this case the most complex. The state reserves the right to continuous legal monitoring of dual citizens.

Global taxation. U.S. citizens are obligated to report their worldwide income to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), wherever they live.

Passport control. Entry into and exit from the United States must be made exclusively with a U.S. passport—this is the official position of the State Department. In practice, the data on the ticket/PNR should match the passport used to cross the U.S. border.

Hidden Reefs: Five Key Challenges for a Dual National (Bipatrid)

Holding two passports is not only about rights; it also entails complex obligations. Here are the key areas where conflicts may arise.

The Wallet: Taxes Without a Double Burden

The biggest fear—having to pay taxes twice—is largely a myth.

Tax obligations are determined not by citizenship (with the exception of the USA) but by tax residency.

You are a tax resident where you have your “center of vital interests”: a permanent home, family, job; or where you spend more than 183 days a year.

To avoid double taxation, Ukraine has effective conventions with all four countries. They operate on two principles:

• Exemption method. Income taxed in one country is exempt from tax in the other.
• Credit method. Tax paid abroad is credited against tax at home. If the home rate is higher, only the difference is payable.

For a Ukrainian in Germany, Poland, or Czechia, the situation is relatively straightforward. Taxes are paid primarily in the country of residency. Conventions with Germany and Poland use a mixed approach: exemption for active income (wages, business) and credit for passive income (dividends, interest).

For a Ukrainian in the United States, things are more complex. Due to the global taxation approach, he or she must file with the IRS for life. FBAR (Report of Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts) is a separate reporting obligation. Every U.S. citizen must personally file FinCEN Form 114 if the aggregate value of foreign financial accounts exceeded $10,000.

There is also FATCA (Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act), which obliges foreign (including Ukrainian) financial institutions to identify accounts belonging to “U.S. persons” and report on them to the IRS.

However, the Convention between the Government of Ukraine and the Government of the United States for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with respect to Taxes on Income and Capital provides for the credit method, which saves from double payment—though not from lifelong reporting to the IRS.

Notably, Ukraine has joined the global system of automatic exchange of tax information. Financial institutions (banks, investment firms) in 120+ participating jurisdictions automatically collect and transmit information on accounts belonging to tax residents of other countries to their national tax services.

This means that the State Tax Service of Ukraine will receive direct data on foreign accounts of its residents. Hiding untaxed income under the umbrella of another citizenship will be difficult.

Duty: Armed Service and Allegiance

Ukraine’s position here is uncompromising: on its territory you are a Ukrainian citizen. Your second passport does not grant immunity from mobilization. If a man of conscription age with Ukrainian and, say, German passports comes to Ukraine to visit relatives, he may be mobilized on the same basis as others.

Meanwhile, while on the territory of another country, you are subject to its laws.

None of the four partner countries currently has mandatory conscription: the USA, Poland, and Czechia have fully professional armies. Germany suspended conscription in 2011, although a discussion is underway about partially reintroducing registration and voluntary service for 18-year-olds from 2026.

However, the laws of these countries also impose obligations for military registration.

For example, in Poland there is an obligation to appear for kwalifikacja wojskowa in the year of turning 19 (some categories of women as well). After qualification, most go into the passive reserve; there is also an active reserve and voluntary basic service (DZSW).

Czechia has a similar model—citizens aged 18–60 are entered into vojenská evidence (military records), and if summoned, one must appear at the regional military command to update data/fitness.

Thus, being drafted into two armies simultaneously is unlikely, but registration in the country of your citizenship or residence is real and often mandatory.

In Ukraine, a “second passport” does not relieve a person physically present in the country from military obligations.

Justice Without Borders? Extradition, Dual Citizenship, and International Traps

One of the cornerstones of international law is the non-extradition of one’s own nationals. Ukraine, Germany, Poland, and Czechia adhere to this principle. The U.S. Constitution does not expressly prohibit extradition of its own citizens. Extradition of Americans is possible, but only if there is a valid extradition treaty or a special arrangement.

Criminal justice issues create the greatest risk of abuse. A person who committed a crime in Ukraine might depart, for example, to Germany, obtain citizenship there, and thus shield themselves from extradition.

However, the ECtHR’s position regarding dual nationals in criminal proceedings is clear and consistent: a person with dual citizenship cannot use their second citizenship to avoid the criminal jurisdiction of a state that lawfully considers them its citizen.

Legal cooperation with European countries is governed by the European Convention on Extradition. Germany, in its reservations to it, directly prohibits the extradition of German nationals. Moreover, due to the war, extradition from Germany to Ukraine is currently effectively suspended, as the German side cannot be confident in human-rights compliance in Ukraine’s penitentiary system.

With the USA, the situation is even more complicated: there is no bilateral extradition treaty between the two countries. Extradition is possible on the basis of reciprocity, but it is always a complex process.

Ukraine has dozens of bilateral and multilateral treaties on mutual legal assistance in criminal matters. They allow for the transfer of evidence, remote questioning, and freezing of assets. However, implementing such procedures on the territory of other states is significantly more difficult than in Ukraine.

Thus, a policy aimed at uniting the nation may inadvertently create “relatively safe harbors” for criminals and significantly complicate accountability.

Protection: Consular Assistance and the Limits of Jurisdiction

With two passports, you may face limitations in consular protection. The U.S. State Department explicitly warns its dual nationals: when you are in the country of your other citizenship, a U.S. consul’s ability to assist will be extremely limited, as the local authorities will treat you as “their own.”

This principle is mirrored. A Ukrainian consul in Prague or Warsaw will have few levers if local police detain a citizen of Czechia or Poland who also holds a Ukrainian passport.

However, if a dual national is detained in a third country, he or she will have the right to choose which consular assistance to use.

Law Without Borders, or Are Our Courts Ready for Dual Citizenship?

The new law on multiple citizenship will force a fundamental review of the national approach in private international law.

Courts and notaries will no longer be able to ignore a person’s second citizenship. On the contrary, it will become a key “connecting factor.” The ability to choose the law of the state of one’s second citizenship transforms citizenship from a purely political status into a decisive legal fact determining the fate of assets worth millions.

Our legal system will no longer be able to remain isolated (though some judges in district courts will “resist” to the end).

The basic principles are: application of the law of the last habitual residence to movable property; lex rei sitae to immovables; and the possibility to choose the law by nationality. Courts will have to analyze the duration and regularity of a person’s stay in a given state, the conditions and reasons for that stay, family and social ties, language, and the location of core assets.

The goal is to determine the state with which the deceased had the closest and most stable connection. Imagine a dual national of Poland and Ukraine who has lived continuously in Lviv for the past 20 years and dies intestate. He owns an apartment in Warsaw, a house in Kyiv, and bank accounts in both countries.

Here it will matter that the decedent’s habitual residence was in Ukraine; therefore, Ukrainian law (as the law of habitual residence) will govern succession to the house in Kyiv and bank accounts in Ukraine and Poland.

However, succession to the Warsaw apartment will be governed exclusively by Polish law based on the principle of lex rei sitae. Recognition and enforcement procedures, as well as interaction between notaries and courts, will most likely take place under the 1993 Treaty on Legal Assistance.

There are many other nuances. For citizens of Poland, Germany, and Czechia who will also hold Ukrainian citizenship, the key instrument regulating succession within the EU is Regulation (EU) No 650/2012. This Regulation unified conflict-of-law rules on succession for all EU Member States (except Denmark and Ireland), creating a single legal space.

For example, in the field of succession a unified document—the European Certificate of Succession—has been introduced. Article 22 of the Regulation allows a person to choose, for the succession as a whole, the law of the state of which they are a national at the time of making the choice or at the time of death. For a person with dual citizenship, e.g., Ukraine and Germany, this means they may expressly state in their will that either German or Ukrainian law will apply to their estate.

In the legal sphere, many questions also arise regarding choice of law in marital agreements. Ukraine’s Law “On Private International Law” allows spouses with different citizenships to choose the law that will govern their property relations in a prenuptial agreement. Consequently, procedures for recognition of foreign court decisions on divorce and maintenance will be relevant, governed by bilateral treaties on legal assistance and the relevant norms of national legislation.

Another sensitive issue will be the increase in international families, which raises risks of international child abduction by one parent.

Ukraine is a party to the key international instruments in this sphere. For example, the Hague Convention of 1980 (on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction). Ratified by Ukraine, it aims at the prompt return of a child who has been unlawfully removed to or retained in another contracting state.

In practical implementation of these treaties, issues will arise regarding the conflict of a child’s status as a citizen of another state “through the father” and the practical return of the child to the territory of Ukraine to the other parent.

Therefore, national courts will have to keep in mind the large number of bilateral treaties concluded between Ukraine and other states on legal assistance in civil matters, and actively apply EU legal regulation norms as appropriate.

Afterword

The law on multiple citizenship is a tool one must learn to use. It opens opportunities for Ukraine: to maintain ties with millions of its citizens, to attract the diaspora’s intellectual and financial capital, and to strengthen its position in the world.

However, the success of this reform depends on how honest and open the state is with its citizens.

Passing the law is only the first step. In fact, for multiple citizenship policy to become a real advantage rather than a legal trap, Ukraine must promptly initiate a revision of legal-assistance treaties with partner countries and update national legislation. Otherwise, instead of new opportunities, citizens risk ending up in a vicious circle of legal collisions and insoluble problems.

Сообщение Two Passports, One Homeland: What the Law on Multiple Citizenship Really Means for Ukrainians появились сначала на Bauman Kondratyuk.

Author: Yurii Bauman, Attorney, Chair of the NAAU Committee on Administrative Law and Procedure
Category: Administrative Law · Practice · Published: 11 June 2025

Contents

1. The Red Line
2. Two Tracks
3. A Principle at Risk
4. Lessons from Strasbourg
5. Pitfalls
6. Afterword
7. Questions & Answers

A public official is suspected of wrongdoing, and society demands a reaction. But can that official be dismissed before a court delivers a verdict? Where is the boundary between cleansing the public service and upholding the right to a defense? This is ultimately a question of trust in the state, not just a procedural nuance.

The Red Line

A public official vested with authority bears not only political or moral responsibility but also legal responsibility, including disciplinary liability. These rules are set out in the Law “On Civil Service” and other special acts, such as the Law “On the National Police.”

A disciplinary offense is not any mistake but a culpable unlawful act or omission. It can include a breach of the oath or service discipline, violations of professional ethics, improper performance or disregard of duties, as well as conduct that discredits a state body or harms the reputation of the service. This is an autonomous legal category. The existence of a disciplinary offense does not depend on whether the conduct shows signs of a criminal offense.

Legislation provides several disciplinary sanctions: remark, reprimand, warning of partial service non-compliance, and the ultimate measure — dismissal. The choice depends on the nature and gravity of the offense, any recurrence, and the official’s prior conduct.

A service investigation is a mandatory stage. Its goal is not formal confirmation but establishing all relevant facts. The findings must be recorded in a report that forms the basis for further decisions. A superficial or incomplete investigation is a ready-made ground for a court to overturn the sanction.

Two Tracks

A criminal proceeding may run in parallel with the disciplinary process. They differ in legal nature, grounds, and consequences, and the law draws a clear line between them. For example, Article 77 of the Law “On the National Police” provides separate grounds for dismissal: as a disciplinary sanction, and upon a final criminal conviction.

The mere existence of a criminal case is not an automatic ground for dismissal. Such a decision is possible only where a disciplinary offense has been established.

The Supreme Court consistently affirms this separation (e.g., judgments of 28.02.2020 in cases No. 825/1398/17 and No. 818/1274/17; 20.10.2020 in No. 340/1502/19; 17.11.2022 in No. 480/9492/20; 07.02.2020 in No. 260/1118/18; 06.03.2020 in No. 804/1758/18; 30.08.2022 in No. 120/8381/20-a; 22.02.2023 in No. 200/11036/20-a; 14.03.2023 in No. 320/1206/21). The service commission must independently assess the facts and decide whether a disciplinary offense is made out.

A Principle at Risk

The presumption of innocence, guaranteed by Article 62 of the Constitution of Ukraine and Article 6(2) of the European Convention on Human Rights, applies to disciplinary bodies as well. The ECtHR emphasizes that the wording in disciplinary acts must not sound as if a person has already been found guilty (Allen v. the United Kingdom; Allende de Ribemont v. France). Even a hint in a decision or public statement can amount to a violation.

If a service-investigation report states that an individual “received an unlawful benefit” before any court verdict, that is a direct path to a finding that the dismissal is unlawful for violating the presumption of innocence.

Lessons from Strasbourg

ECtHR case law sets standards of fair process in disciplinary matters involving public servants (Article 6 ECHR). The “civil” limb applies where the dispute affects the right to work (Vilho Eskelinen and Others v. Finland). The Court distinguishes criminal-law assessment from an appraisal of conduct through the lens of public-service ethics (X. v. Austria; C. v. the United Kingdom; Ringvold v. Norway).

Legal certainty matters just as much: grounds for disciplinary liability must be foreseeable (Oleksandr Volkov v. Ukraine). Even if the proceeding is not criminal, it must satisfy core fairness standards: adequate notice, the right to be heard, evidence, and a reasoned decision (Denisov v. Ukraine).

Pitfalls

Typical errors that lead courts to quash dismissals include haste, formalistic investigations, conflating legal concepts, relying on public outcry, and vague grounds. Key questions:

• When to launch a service investigation: entry in the Unified Register vs. service of suspicion?
• Are disciplinary offenses being quietly replaced with corruption offenses that actually require a court judgment (para. 10 part 1 Art. 77 of the National Police Law; Supreme Court judgment of 02.10.2019 in case No. 804/4096/17)?
• Have concrete breaches of the job description been properly recorded?
• Were procedural guarantees respected: the right to be heard, to adduce evidence, and to receive a reasoned decision?

The Constitutional Court of Ukraine (case No. 1-15/99, decision No. 9-rp/99) has noted that the stage of criminal prosecution begins with the service of an indictment. In practice, detention or service of suspicion too often becomes an unjustified trigger for disciplinary procedures.

Afterword

Bottom line: dismissing a public official before a court verdict is permissible only where a disciplinary offense is clearly proven and the procedure is fully respected. Disciplinary proceedings are autonomous, do not replace the criminal process, and must respect the presumption of innocence. Wording, evidence and procedural guarantees are the keys to a lawful decision.

Published: 11 June 2025

The original text was first published on Yur-Gazeta: yur-gazeta.com/…/zvilnennya-bez-viroku-…

Questions & Answers (Administrative and Criminal Law)

When is dismissal before a verdict lawful? When the service investigation establishes a disciplinary offense and the sanction is proportionate. Can media buzz be a ground for dismissal? No. You need facts and admissible evidence within a proper disciplinary procedure. How to avoid breaching the presumption of innocence? Avoid criminal-law phrasing in disciplinary acts; describe conduct using public-service standards. What does a defense lawyer do here? Audits the procedure, evidence, and wording; builds a legal position with Supreme Court and ECtHR references.

Need an assessment of your situation? Leave a request via the contact form — we will respond and propose a defense strategy.

Disclaimer: this material is for general information only and does not constitute legal advice. For advice on a specific case, please seek individual legal assistance.

Сообщение Dismissal without a verdict: legal boundaries and case law in matters involving public officials появились сначала на Bauman Kondratyuk.

The trust boundary: how to conclude an attorney–client agreement without risk for client and attorney

Yurii Bauman explains how to structure an attorney–client agreement to prevent future disputes and misunderstandings — aligning legal literacy, professional ethics, a balance of interests and the reality of Ukrainian practice.

Core idea: a clear written agreement is the foundation of trust between attorney and client. It sets expectations, boundaries of responsibility, payment and communications — protecting both sides.

Legal framework & ethics

The agreement should comply with the Law of Ukraine “On the bar and Legal practice” and the Rules of Attorney Ethics. It must correctly define the attorney’s status, the subject and scope of legal assistance, and the rules of interaction with the client.

Watch the video: practical advice by Yurii Bauman

In the video, we dissect typical mistakes and real-life cases from Ukrainian practice. Watch it to apply the advice to your agreements quickly.

Ask a question

FAQ

Can the fee change during the engagement?

Yes, if the agreement provides for it (hourly billing, extra work, inflation clauses). We recommend formalising changes via addenda.

How do we ensure confidentiality?

Include confidentiality/NDA terms, a file-sharing policy, messenger rules and backup procedures in the agreement.

What if a conflict of interest arises?

Notify the client immediately, suspend action and proceed under the Rules of Attorney Ethics and the Law of Ukraine “On the Bar and Legal Practice”.

Сообщение How to conclude an attorney–client agreement without risk появились сначала на Bauman Kondratyuk.

On February 6, 2025, the Sixth Administrative Court of Appeal rendered a significant decision in the field of tax law and business protection. The court granted the appeal filed by attorney Yurii Bauman in the interests of the market leader in ventilation equipment, LLC “Pukhivsky Ventilation Plant”, and declared unlawful the tax notice-decision regarding the imposition of penalties for allegedly overdue foreign currency settlements.

The essence of the dispute lay in the fact that the State Tax Service of Ukraine imposed penalties on the taxpayer for violating the deadlines for settlements under a foreign economic contract with “Refrion S.R.L.” (Italy).

In the appellate court, the attorneys argued that, in accordance with Part 6 of Article 13 of the Law of Ukraine “On Currency and Currency Transactions”, the calculation of settlement deadlines is suspended for the duration of force majeure circumstances. The legal position was built on the premise that contractual obligations were not fulfilled on time due to force majeure circumstances caused by martial law, including hostilities in the Kyiv region, subsequent defense measures, the mining of the enterprise’s territory, and other related factors.

The complexity of the case was compounded by the fact that in the court of first instance, the taxpayer was represented by a different law firm, which failed to properly collect and present the necessary evidentiary base.

At the stage of appellate review, the taxpayer made the strategic decision to completely replace its legal advisory team.

The legal team of Bauman Kondratyuk Law Firm faced a challenging procedural task—gathering the evidentiary base. The evidentiary foundation was compiled through obtaining evidence from local government authorities, military units, conducting interviews with individuals involved in the defense measures in the Kyiv region, and submitting inquiries to Ukrainian diplomatic missions abroad.

The proceedings before the Sixth Administrative Court of Appeal lasted more than a year.

The outcome—a favorable decision for the client: the tax notice-decision was annulled.

This case underscores the critical importance of professional legal support in safeguarding business rights. Thanks to a well-structured defense strategy, the attorneys of Bauman Kondratyuk Law Firm successfully proved the unlawfulness of the STS’s actions and defended the interests of their client.

The court’s decision highlights the necessity of conducting a thorough analysis of specific circumstances during tax audits in the context of business protection.

The legal representation and defense in this case were carried out by Yurii Bauman and Maria Koshova.

Сообщение The court declared the State Tax Service’s decision on the imposition of penalties unlawful появились сначала на Bauman Kondratyuk.

The Attorneys Association  “Bauman Kondratyuk” is pleased to announce the provision of professional sworn translation services. Our expert in this field, Maria Bekerenkova, is a qualified sworn translator authorized by the Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Poland.

Who is a Sworn Translator?

A sworn translator is a certified professional authorized to officially translate legal and official documents and certify their accuracy and compliance with the original. According to the Act of November 25, 2004, on the Profession of Sworn Translator (Ustawa z dnia 25 listopada 2004 r. O zawodzie tłumacza przysięgłego) of the Republic of Poland, a sworn translator is entitled to:

• Translate and certify translations from a foreign language into Polish and from Polish into a foreign language.
• Verify and certify translations prepared by other translators.
• Certify copies of documents in a foreign language.
• Provide oral translations.

Maria Bekerenkova ensures the highest quality of translations while adhering to professional ethics, guaranteeing confidentiality and accuracy in handling your documents. Her extensive experience and qualifications enable effective collaboration with courts, governmental institutions, and private clients.

Why Choose Us?

By entrusting your documents to the Attorneys Association “Bauman Kondratyuk,” you can be assured of professionalism and reliability in sworn translation services. We are committed to assisting you with legal matters related to the translation of official documents.

Contact Us

For further information or to request our services, please contact us using the details provided on our website.

Сообщение A Sworn Translator Joins the Team появились сначала на Bauman Kondratyuk.